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Identity fraud is going to become a pandemic if not addressed with innovative 
methods designed to mitigate the threats early on as well as to allow for the 
collaborative effort from the many organizations involved in cleanup process.  The 
Bureau of Justice Statistics published an alarming study that stated that as many as 17 
million Americans have been victims of identity fraud in 2012 at a national cost of $25 
billion while the cost of all other property-related crimes totaled just $14 billion (Harrell & 
Langton, 2013).  Offense specific fusion centers, which transcend the traditional law 
enforcement shroud and encompass the private industry, should be created and 
implemented to fully address the issues surrounding identity fraud and the risks 
associated with such offenses.  In doing so, the costs associated with the victimization 
can be mitigated or eliminated thus passing on those savings to the general public 
through reduced private industry costs.  
Current estimates show that $0.05 of every dollar spent by U.S. consumers is 
directly related to fraud (Newman, 2002).  Another benefit are the reduced costs for 
those assigned to investigate these offenses which may include law enforcement; local 
and federal government; and the private industry.  Often, the efforts at the various levels 
of government are not harmonious and thus the sharing of vital information may not be 
passed along to those agencies that may be in a position to stop the threat.  There is 
rising sentiment to the overuse of government oversight, which then lends itself to the 
possibility of overspending, both of which can be overcome through proper monitoring 
protocols.  Thus, real-time crime-specific sharing apparatuses must be used to counter 
this growing threat before it endangers the global economy. 
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 As crime evolves in the twenty-first century, law enforcement and the private 
sector must ensure that they are, at the very least, matching that evolution in order to 
avoid being passed by those who intend to upset the balance as it currently sits.  As law 
enforcement continually seeks ways to spur innovation, one common theme is to call for 
the building of a robust system for the sharing of real-time intelligence information as a 
way to combat the ever-growing problem presented by identity fraud offenses.  The 
Bureau of Justice Statistics published an alarming study that stated that as many as 17 
million Americans, 7% of the working age citizens, have been victims of identity fraud in 
2012 at a national cost of $25 billion while the cost of all other property-related crimes 
totaled just $14 billion (Harrell & Langton, 2013).  As these offenses present newer 
large-scale attacks, it becomes increasingly critical to have a system that can 
immediately share relevant and time-sensitive information between varying levels of law 
enforcement and their partners in the private sector, namely the banking industry. 
 Identity fraud offenses are relegated to a specific set of offenses in which one or 
more culprits use the personal information of another, without that person's consent, in 
a manner which brings harm to the victim (Texas Penal Code Title 7, 2014).  While each 
state has varying terms and penalties related to these offenses, at their core, they all 
relate to the unauthorized taking of someone else's private information for personal 
gain.  McNally and Newman (2005) defined identity theft through Congress' Identity 
Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act of 1998 as anyone who "knowingly transfers or 
uses, without lawful authority, any name or number to identify a specific individual with 
the intent to commit  any unlawful activity that constitutes a felony under any applicable 
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State or local law" (p. 1).  Identity fraud can often be wrongly misconstrued to be only 
the unauthorized taking of someone's personal information, such as social security 
number for the sole reason of taking over someone else's identity.  While this is 
certainly a type of identity fraud, one must not forget the greater occurrence of offenses 
such as credit or debit card and check fraud.  For the purposes of this paper, identity 
fraud offenses are taken to mean those offenses which fall under Texas' Penal Code 
Title 7, Chapter 32 Fraud. 
 Fusion centers are an interesting concept that only recently have taken shape 
and begun to hit their stride in obtaining their objectives as laid out by the Departments 
of Justice and Homeland Security in mitigating a broad spectrum of threats.  The U.S. 
Department of Justice defines a fusion center as “a collaborative effort of two or more 
agencies that provide resources, expertise and information to the center with the goal of 
maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and 
terrorist activity" (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008, p. 47).  Fusion centers are, in 
essence, a centrally-located collaborative center for various officials to provide 
analytical data and research on a variety of topics to those in the field and those at a 
senior command level for strategic-level planning.  Currently, there are 53 primary 
fusion centers spread across the country and 25 recognized fusion centers.  Each of 
these fusion centers carry different responsibilities to those whom they serve but all are 
centrally dictated to carry about similar functions and all are regulated by local, state, 
and federal laws and regulations.  Primary fusion centers receive the greatest funding 
and allocation of federal resources to include personnel while recognized fusion centers 
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are those centers not sponsored by federal funding, who are instead designated by their 
representative state decrees (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2014). 
 Identity fraud cannot be allowed to continually seep through the cracks of society 
to erode and shake the foundation of trust built in the very system it espouses to 
destroy.  Thus, the problem must be addressed head-on, in a manner that gives it the 
credence and attention it deserves.  Multi-jurisdictional, representing various levels of 
law enforcement and a broad spectrum of private industry, identity fraud-related fusion 
centers should be created and implemented to combat the rising trend in identity theft.  
Effectively tackling identity theft calls for the coordinated effort amongst law 
enforcement and the private sector using a shared intelligence model such as fusion 
centers as a way to jointly attack the problem and eliminate on-going threats.  The 
elimination of identity fraud greatly benefits the public, law enforcement, and the private 
sector to such a decree as the elimination of prohibition represented to the same parties 
in the 1920s through the reduction of crime costing the U.S. taxpayers millions of dollars 
annually.  
POSITION 
 With the tragic consequences of the attacks of September 11th, the federal 
government mandated the reassessment of the intelligence process as a way to 
potentially mitigate future attacks on United States. One of the major failures discovered 
came through the failure to adequately share information across broad spectrums of 
industry to include the various levels of law enforcement and the private sector, 
specifically the banking industry.  In creating local and state fusion centers across the 
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country, the benefits across the broad spectrum of people and entities will shake the 
very foundation of the identity theft crisis. 
 The overwhelming victimization of those affected by identity theft related offenses 
occurs to the public.  There is not a single state in the United States that does not feel 
the effects of identity theft in some form which results in countless hours lost as people 
attempt to pick up the pieces of their shattered lives.  Not only are people victimized 
through the initial offense but are again victimized while going through the very system 
put in place to help either catch the offenders or those put in place to offer the 
assistance needed afterwards.  In typical identity theft offenses, victims experience an 
initial loss, either of their personal information or perhaps a credit card, which is 
compromised once, used once, and then is never used again.  This would be 
considered a classic identity theft and one that presents the victim with the least amount 
of emotional scaring.  On average, the typical identity fraud victim incurs a financial 
burden, associated to the misuse of their information and any mitigation efforts, of 
approximately $500 per incident (Finklea, 2014).  This figure does not calculate the 
effects of work time missed nor the potential ongoing cost if they are repeatedly 
victimized.   
 The most common example of identity fraud is credit and debit card fraud as 
reported between the years 2000 and 2008 (Federal Trade Commission, 2012).  With a 
staggering cost of approximately $25 billion in lost revenues to corporate entities, those 
costs are passed on to consumers as increased costs of doing business.  Much the 
same as costs of shoplifting are passed on to consumers as wastage, this push-back 
cost can be lowered as incidents of identity fraud are reduced or outright eliminated.  
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 Along these same lines, the costs that are absorbed by law enforcement 
agencies, is staggering due to the labor intensive investigations that are often required 
to solve these offenses.  As is typically seen, credit card frauds involve several separate 
criminal episodes that must each, in their own unique way, must be solved in order to 
lead back to the culprit.  There is usually an initial theft or compromise of the credit card 
number that must be first identified and investigated because the initial thief may not be 
the later culprit who uses that stolen credit card information.   
 A current issue affecting all the states lining the Gulf of Mexico and the East 
Coast are the thieves known as the "Felony Lane Gang" who are known for smashing 
the windows of unsuspecting mothers as they drop off their children at their daycare 
centers (Cops, 2014).  These "gang" members then either pass off those stolen credit 
cards or simply take them to local establishments to make illegal purchases using those 
stolen credit cards.  They are also using stolen checking information and attempting, 
often successfully, to make fraudulent withdrawals from the victim's banking institutions 
using the outer-most lane, often referred to as the felony lane, making it hard for the 
Bank's teller to compare identities between the individual driving and the stolen identity 
from a stolen driver's license.  Successful prosecutions are being seen across the 
country as investigators, from both the private sector and law enforcement, are learning 
to share information in near real-time through intelligence centers such as fusion 
centers and other federally sponsored intelligence-sharing platforms (Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, 2012). 
 According to a review conducted by McNally and Newman, "The FBI estimated 
the average cost of an investigation... to be $20,000 between 1998 and 2000.  Further, 
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many cases handled by these agencies do not involve elements of identity theft, which 
may require considerably more resources to investigate" (McNally & Newman, 2005, p. 
33).  The very concept of a fusion center is to reduce redundancy and bring about more 
efficient use of investigators time by having all the involved knowledge bases brought 
into a joint environment ensuring better collaboration.  Considerable time is wasted in 
investigations, duplicating work that has either been done by another law enforcement 
agency or by an investigator in the private sector who is tasked with identifying 
breaches to their corporate information.  If these costs are reduced through better 
collaboration, that cost savings can either be reinvested into the agency, such as more 
officers who can be directed at other crime sectors, or it can be passed back to the 
public as reduced operating costs.   
 Identity fraud offenses tend to spread themselves out across multiple 
jurisdictions, especially in larger metropolitan areas such as Houston, Dallas, or San 
Antonio where multiple jurisdictions often overlap or have flowing boundaries that do not 
follow clearly identified lines of demarcation.  In reviewing the Felony Lane Gang, it is 
seen that the criminals will often roam city to city in search of easy victims and thus their 
offenses should be looked at as a criminal spree versus a one-time offense.  With this 
change in thought, the use of a real-time intelligence sharing apparatus could easily link 
these offenses and divvy out investigative responsibilities to better maximize the 
resources involved.  This also has the benefit of allowing investigators to link their 
offenses to other on-going offenses which in turn increases the odds of a successful 
prosecution.  Oftentimes, investigators are unaware of other on-going investigations that 
have or could have a major impact on their cases to include other agencies that have 
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prosecuted the same individuals sought by other agencies.  If information could be 
freely shared, there would be no need to spend countless hours wasting investigative 
resources in the attempt to identify criminals who have already been identified and 
prosecuted by other agencies. 
 Fusion centers have become synonymous with counter-terrorism and drug 
interdiction efforts.  This train of thought has effectively limited the abilities of these 
fusion centers to these responsibilities but in its narrow-minded focus, other uses have 
been cast aside.  In changing the mindset about how to effectively utilize fusion centers, 
important and costly crimes can be greatly reduced or eliminated completely when 
brought to the forefront of these mighty crime fighting entities.  As patrol officers are 
called to the scene of a possible crime involving any fraud-related offense, those 
officers can, in real-time, relay information back to a fusion center to be quickly 
analyzed and that information relayed back to the officer to assist them in their 
investigation.  When utilized in this way, officers are better able to link a criminal 
predicate which in turn raises the solvability rate of those offenses.  According to 
Johnson, with the Rio Vista Police Department, it is important that patrol officers and 
other initial responders have a clear understanding of solvability factors as this 
information is crucial to successful follow-up investigations or there runs a risk of cases 
not being assigned due to the lack of solvability factors (Johnson, 1998).  Therefore, if 
the initial investigating officer can utilize real-time information to correctly annotate on 
their offense report, there is a higher likelihood of a successful follow-up investigation 
when the case is turned over to the Investigations Division.  This is a more efficient use 
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of the investigator's time as they do not have to duplicate work that could or should have 
been done by the initial investigating officer, had that information been readily available. 
 The use of fusion centers as they relate to identity fraud-related offenses can 
utilize near real-time information to reduce costs incurred by the citizens, the private 
sector, and the government in the form of investigative resources.  Victims no longer 
have to endure being re-victimized by the very system set in place to protect them due 
to the lack of intelligence sharing protocols and as such, large crime sprees can be 
quickly investigated and possibly solved when information is freely shared. 
COUNTER POSITION 
 Law enforcement agencies typically do not 'play nice' with other agencies 
especially in terms of sharing information or intelligence.  The thought of sharing 
information is a relatively new concept as the failures of the pre-9/11 environment 
showed in that if information is freely shared at near real-time, threats can be quickly 
identified and possibly mitigated.  There is a concern for privacy rights and 
dissemination rights, which is a legitimate concern (Bain, 2008). In their book, Police 
and Government Relations: Who’s Calling the Shots?, Beare and Murray expounded 
upon this further by adding that an agency’s ego is usually to blame for poor information 
sharing in that an agency may hold onto information as a source of power (Beare & 
Murray, 2007).  Fusion centers are the antithesis of the old adage of hording information 
for the holding agency to gain power and influence as a means of doing business.  As 
has been seen post 9/11, information sharing has a greater good associated with it than 
the need to withhold that information for the agencies own uses. 
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 Not everyone welcomes the use of these intelligence sharing capabilities as seen 
by a 2005 statement from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) where they laid out 
reasons for their concern to civil rights: “The establishment of a single source 
intelligence center raises important issues concerning the scope of its operations and 
need for safeguards to ensure that its operation do not violate civil liberties or intrude on 
personal privacy” (American Civil Liberties Union, 2005, para. 2). Civil rights violations 
are an unfortunate aspect that is continually dealt with in law enforcement but there are 
relatively easy ways to counteract these concerns through the use of transparency, 
adequate policies and procedures, and government oversight such as that which is 
used to govern intelligence sharing databases, 28 Code of Federal Regulations Part 23 
(28 CFR Part 23). 
 The greatest concern in regards to implementing the use of fusion centers as 
they relate to identity fraud-related offenses is the initial cost and high operating costs.  
In a biting 141 page report, the Senate's permanent subcommittee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs identified significant areas of wasteful spending with 
inadequate oversight in their spending practices (Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 2012, p. 61).  They further went on to state that in order to assess 
the success of any program, one must know how much has been invested to show the 
return on investment but the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been unable 
to identify what returns, if any, they have received from the outpouring of public funds.  
To counteract this outpouring of public funds into a controversial area, it can be argued 
that the use of private-sector funds and fees related to court costs and fees should take 
a higher initiative.    The Bill Blackwood Law Enforcement Management Institute of 
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Texas (LEMIT) is an example of a successful program that uses court fees assessed on 
criminal offenses to fully support the program which is a nationally recognized law 
enforcement leadership programs that prepares officers for roles in command-level 
leadership positions by affording them an academic background in leadership theory 
and applicability (Oakley, 1997).   As the private-sector sees a cost-benefit to the 
investment in such centers, the monetary support should follow.  Another source of 
revenue that could alleviate the burden on public funds could come from funds seized 
from criminals after their successful prosecutions which helps eliminate any wrongful 
seizures that occur prior to prosecution thereby adding in an additional checks and 
balances factor through the use of a third party, the court in this instance, that ensures 
any seizure funds used are those that have been deemed illicitly gained proceeds. 
RECOMMENDATION 
 Real-time intelligence and investigative-lead sharing apparatuses should be 
implemented to address the issue of identity fraud using the resources of both law 
enforcement and the private sector.  The current law enforcement culture already 
supports the use of fusion centers as a reactionary and, hopefully, a proactive approach 
to crime solving.  A shift in mindset should happen between law enforcement and the 
private-sector, namely the banking industry, to allow for a collaborative approach to this 
fastest rising criminal sector. 
 In using the cross-industry fusion center approach to solving criminal activity, a 
collaborative approach will be used to a degree that has not been done before.  
Typically, financial industries utilize their own investigative resources to mitigate losses 
to their bottom-line but those same resources can be a valuable resource to law 
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enforcement whose objective is not too different than their private-sector counterparts.  
This then results in a benefit to all involved, from the victim to the law enforcement 
investigators and finally to the State.  Additionally, the banking industry could reap the 
rewards in terms of millions of dollars saved to either be passed back to the consumer 
or into the very program for which they can thank for that savings.  There are estimates 
that $0.05 of every dollar spent was in some way related to fraud and that amount 
roughly translates to over a billion dollars in the U.S (Newman, 2002).  The benefits are 
mainly in monetary terms due to the high amount of monetary investment from each of 
those end users but those effects can also be felt through the increased efficiency seen 
across all industries as these offenses are cleaned up or eliminated.  
 This approach will not be taken so lightly by the public who already heavily 
distrusts the banking industry and, at best, has contempt for law enforcement.  In this 
day in age where the various intelligence apparatuses have been caught with their 
pants down while snooping on the very citizens they proclaim to protect, the addition of 
another intelligence gathering, sharing, and analyzing think-tank may push those 
sentiments to the breaking point.  This line of thought can be overcome through the 
fusion center having both governmental and private oversight through use of strict policy 
and procedures set in place so that the information gained, used, analyzed, and 
distributed meets the strictest possible guidelines to protect the general public.  The 
banking industry already has set in place some of the strictest consumer protections 
already in place and so does the current fusion center through use of the Code of 
Federal Regulations.  Another way to circumvent this issue is to have the public 
understand that law enforcement will not have access to sensitive banking databases 
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and vice versa so as to keep each system's integrity in place.  Instead, those 
investigators from both industries will simply be housed in the same location to allow for 
quicker, real-time information to be passed back and forth in order to capture streams of 
seemly unrelated data and process them together to have a better understanding of the 
whole picture instead of just having the 'slice of the pie' dealt to them by their proximity 
to either the offense or the victim.  In the State of Texas, victims of fraud, especially 
those involving credit card offenses, have the ability to report offenses to either the 
agency where they live, where the initial theft or breach of the credit card's information 
occurred, or where the card was fraudulently used (Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 
2014).  Using this approach, while convenient for the victim, ensures that those 
agencies involved may never be able to link the various offenses and victims that may 
be connected due to great distances and unfamiliarity between agencies.   
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has already established an intelligence 
sharing program, InfraGard, similar in nature but dealing strictly with the protection of 
infrastructure.  This program has been around since 1996 but even though this program 
has enjoyed great success, it too is not immune from the perception of malfeasance.  A 
2004 report from the  ACLU stated "there is evidence that InfraGard may be closer to a 
corporate TIPS program, turning private-sector corporations - some of which may be in 
the position to observe the activities of millions of individual customers - into surrogate 
eyes and ears for the FBI" (Stanley, 2004, p.12).  Some 18 years later, there have been 
no reports to substantiate this line of thought or any reports of malfeasance.  InfraGard 
also deals with the protection of infrastructure from terrorist attacks but does not 
concern itself with issues that can be directly understood through the burden placed 
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upon the public in terms of losses to businesses which are then put on the backs of their 
customers. 
 Lastly, the issue that stands the greatest chance of dooming this concept is the 
issue of cost or funding.  Understandably, there will be a large upfront cost to establish 
these centers across the U.S. in terms of infrastructure, network capabilities, data 
storage, and personnel but these costs can be offset in a myriad of ways to include the 
use of monetary seizures, dedicated funding through the court system, and federal and 
state grants or some combination of the three.  In a two year span, 2001-2002, Texas 
received over $22 million in seized property and in 2006, $33 million of actual currency 
was seized (Williams, Holcomb, & Kovandzic, 2010).  Fusion centers would be 
expected to cost millions each year to operate and these costs can easily be offset 
through the proper restructuring of current procedures nation-wide so as to capture 
minor amounts from each seizure across the country which would result in millions of 
dollars available for expenditures.  Another example would be to use the court systems 
to help offset some of the costs by imposing minor fees, such as the LEMIT program 
has already in place, on each criminal court proceeding.  This would require that 
legislation be passed in each state's legislature but again, with a little education to the 
public in terms of cost-savings, this issue should have relatively easy success passing 
into law.  Finally, there is the need to gather financial support from the private-sector 
which may be a little more difficult.  Businesses must rely on the bottom dollar for any 
decisions they make and the benefits may not be immediately apparent to those 
corporations until success is seen through the reduction of fraud.  This type of success 
is not easily quantifiable and may have to have a period of 'watch and see' imposed 
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upon the centers as a measure of success.  Corporations can shift their operations for 
these types of endeavors over to the fusion centers but those shifts will incur costs but 
again, those costs can be offset through the funding ideas previously proposed.  Simply 
put, if the corporations will shift their operations over to the fusion center, the centers 
can be self-funding until success is measured and then that success can then be sold 
back to the corporations for future funding.  Funding will ultimately be the most difficult 
hurdle to leap over but one that has a myriad of solutions for those of creative 
aspirations.   
 This type of program is not new and has already seen great successes in 
England through the Metropolitan and London Police's Dedicated Cheque and Plastic 
Crime Unit established in 2011 with primary monetary support from banks that are 
members of the Association of Payment Clearing Services (APACS).  News reports 
have praised them in that in addition to investigating identity fraud offenses, they will 
investigate check, cash machine, and other offenses where organized crime is involved.  
The APACS members have funded approximately three-quarters of the start-up costs, 
thus freeing up government monies for other tasks (Fight against credit card fraud, 
2011).  In October 2012, the unit successfully apprehended a criminal organization who 
exceeded £10 million and who was estimated to be making approximately £50,000 a 
week by passing counterfeit checks (City of London Police, 2012).  
 It is proposed that Texas follow the Dedicated Cheque and Plastic Crime Unit's 
model, either in one of the larger metropolitan areas such as Dallas, Houston, or San 
Antonio, with the same modeling as currently established through use of the current 
fusion centers.  An easier solution may be to simply allow for space in the already 
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established fusion centers for these units to be implemented statewide so as to reduce 
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